Neither Washington Nor Beijing

POPPY S. Winanti is Professor of International Relations in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Universitas Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta, one of Indonesia's leading universities, where she served as Vice Dean for Academic and Student Affairs from 2021 to 2026; in 2023 she became the first woman to be appointed a professor of international relations there.

She studies global political economy, where politics and economics meet between countries, with a focus on trade, natural resources, the shift from fossil fuels to clean energy and how emerging economies cooperate. In January 2025 Indonesia, the world's fourth most populous country, became the first Southeast Asian member of BRICS, the group that began with Brazil, Russia, India and China.

We asked her what membership really buys, and why refusing to pick a side between Washington and Beijing is a strategy rather than a dodge.

The Confluence: To start, how did you first become drawn to global political economy, and specifically to questions about Indonesia's place in groups like BRICS?

Dr. Winanti: I teach International Relations at Universitas Gadjah Mada, where our IR department offers three main concentrations: International Politics and Security; Peace and Conflict Studies; and International Political Economy and Development (IPED). As a political economist trained at master's and PhD level, I mainly teach IPED-related courses. My research covers global and regional trade; conflict and the political economy of natural resources and extractive industries; the global green agenda and political ecology; and South-South cooperation.

Recently my work has focused on economic nationalism, Indonesia's industrial policy for moving up global value chains [doing more of the higher-value stages of production at home], Indonesia's BRICS membership and green transition, the politics of international trade, the global governance of sustainable commodities, state capacity in the energy transition, how global norms are adopted locally in the extractive sector, resource nationalism and emerging donors.

That background drew me into the study of the global political economy. As a branch of IR, international political economy offers valuable insights, including into how BRICS emerged and developed, and how emerging economies like Indonesia take part in the group.

The Confluence: What is the biggest misconception about what BRICS membership actually does for a country's bargaining power?

Dr. Winanti: I think there is a common misconception about BRICS that needs clearing up. Many believe it is an international organisation that its founding members set out to create, and that it represents a unified stance on global issues. In reality, BRICS originally comprised Brazil, Russia, India and China, based on the economist Jim O'Neill's 2001 prediction that these emerging economies would become major drivers of global growth. He suggested that their influence, especially China's, could reshape the world economy by 2050, and that institutions like the G7 should consider including the BRIC nations.

The first BRIC summit was held in 2009 in Yekaterinburg, Russia, several years after O'Neill's prediction, with South Africa joining in 2010 to represent Africa. By 2024 and 2025, six more countries, including Indonesia, the first Southeast Asian member, had joined, creating BRICS+. Today the group makes up over a quarter of the global economy and nearly half of the world's population.

Although BRICS+ has recently become an intergovernmental organisation, it still operates as a loose coalition of non-Western nations cooperating on economic and diplomatic issues. Internally, rivalry has increased, especially between China and India, because of longstanding border disputes and competition for influence in the Global South [the world's developing countries]. The war in Ukraine has also divided the group, as some members support Western sanctions on Russia while others ignore them.

The Confluence: What is the most surprising or counterintuitive way in which Indonesia's interests differ from those of other BRICS members? If you had to explain to a sceptic why Indonesia joining BRICS matters, or does not, what would you say?

Dr. Winanti: Indonesia's BRICS membership brings two main benefits: boosting its economic growth potential and strengthening its global political influence. BRICS+ provides access to alternative sources of funding, such as the New Development Bank (NDB) [the development bank set up by BRICS], particularly for green projects under its Sustainable Financing Policy Framework. Indonesia might also use the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) for liquidity support during financial crises, as an alternative to the IMF.

Most BRICS+ countries are fast-growing emerging markets, which gives Indonesia opportunities to expand trade and investment, reach new markets, attract foreign direct investment (FDI), diversify its trade relationships and build cooperation with other emerging economies based on equality, respect and sustainability. However, China and India are already Indonesia's main trading partners, with China its top source of imports, and both are part of agreements such as RCEP, the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and APEC. In 2024, mainland China was Indonesia's third-largest source of FDI.

To get the most out of BRICS, Indonesia should diversify its economic partnerships beyond China and India. Strengthening ties with the other BRICS members is challenging, because trade complementarity [how well one country's exports match another's imports] with BRICS nations is generally low compared with the G20 or ASEAN, which suggests limited compatibility. Sanctions on Iran and Russia also make it harder for Indonesia to build closer links.

Given current geopolitical tensions, Indonesia may need to increase its global political influence to protect its interests. Joining BRICS+ could help push for reform of Western-led global institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, to make them more inclusive of emerging economies. It also gives Indonesia a platform to address global challenges like climate change, poverty and inequality from the perspective of developing countries.

In the energy transition, for instance, BRICS+ endorses a framework based on CBDR-RC [the UN principle that richer countries, having polluted first, should do more], respecting the rights of developing nations while moving towards net-zero emissions.

Overall, BRICS+ encourages economic cooperation, reform of global institutions and solutions to worldwide problems, despite some difficulties in putting them into practice. But membership also carries risks: more trade may threaten local industries, Indonesia may stay reliant on exporting raw commodities instead of diversifying, and China's dominance could deepen Indonesia's dependence on its economy.

The Confluence: What is one thing you wish the public understood better about how middle powers like Indonesia navigate great-power competition?

Dr. Winanti: I wish the public realised that middle powers like Indonesia are not simply choosing sides between the US and China. Instead, Indonesia seeks strategic autonomy by engaging with many countries on different issues while avoiding heavy reliance on any single one. This is not indecision; it is a calculated strategy to protect national interests and keep diplomatic flexibility.

Moreover, middle powers see great-power competition as more than an ideological battle. Indonesia might partner with China on trade and infrastructure, with the US on security, and with other emerging economies through BRICS. These ties are not contradictory; they reflect a pragmatic approach to securing benefits while managing risks.

Lastly, many people think non-alignment [refusing to take sides between great powers, Indonesia's stance since the 1950s] means neutrality or passivity. In truth, Indonesia actively balances economic, security, domestic and regional priorities, seeking to influence great-power dynamics while avoiding submission to any major power, even though that is very challenging in practice.